Endpoint Hardening Register

Standards document 21 pages

CYBR-STRESS-068

This document is part of a 100-file corpus used to exercise document pipelines, reading systems and accessibility tooling. Content is generated for volume and structure; it is not operational advice.

The remote access path is evidenced by the approved design baseline. The vulnerability queue is measured against the quarterly review notes. The asset register is measured against the most recent exercise record. The backup rotation is measured against the signed exception log. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

Every internet-facing service is measured against the ticket history for the period. The recovery test is compared with the commissioning document. The remote access path is documented alongside the register of exceptions. The asset register is compared with the dependency map. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

1. The access review process

The change process is traced to the register of exceptions. The mobile standard is documented alongside the approved design baseline. The risk register is checked against the register of exceptions. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The access review process is compared with the register of exceptions. Every internet-facing service is reviewed against the dependency map. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The awareness cycle is traced to the commissioning document. The backup rotation is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

2. The vendor register

The classification scheme is documented alongside the approved design baseline. The access review process is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. The patch calendar is documented alongside the ticket history for the period. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

3. Every internet-facing service

The hardened build is validated by the approved design baseline. The mobile standard is measured against the ticket history for the period. The vulnerability queue is checked against the commissioning document. The access review process is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

4. The classification scheme

The third-party register is traced to the current written standard. The asset register is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. The metric set is documented alongside the register of exceptions. The awareness cycle is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The vulnerability queue is documented alongside the register of exceptions. The hardened build is evidenced by the current written standard. The endpoint baseline is traced to the quarterly review notes. Each administrative account is validated by the approved design baseline. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

Every internet-facing service is compared with the register of exceptions. The metric set is reviewed against the signed exception log. The hardened build is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The identity lifecycle is reconciled with the register of exceptions. The risk register is reconciled with the dependency map. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The vulnerability queue is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. The vulnerability queue is traced to the agreed service level. The physical controls is documented alongside the approved design baseline. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The remote access path is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The email authentication record is documented alongside the commissioning document. The email authentication record is checked against the commissioning document. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The mobile standard is reconciled with the dependency map. The monitoring pipeline is validated by the previous year's assessment. The risk register is reconciled with the commissioning document. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The email authentication record is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. The email authentication record is reconciled with the commissioning document. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The threat model is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. The physical controls is reconciled with the dependency map. The access review process is compared with the dependency map. The privileged access list is compared with the current written standard. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The monitoring pipeline is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The metric set is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. The access review process is documented alongside the current written standard. The vulnerability queue is validated by the agreed service level. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The endpoint baseline is compared with the most recent exercise record. The threat model is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. The third-party register is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The hardened build is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. The access review process is checked against the agreed service level. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The physical controls is compared with the signed exception log. The hardened build is compared with the register of exceptions. Every internet-facing service is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. The cloud baseline is measured against the approved design baseline. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

Every internet-facing service is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The third-party register is measured against the dependency map. The monitoring pipeline is evidenced by the current written standard. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The awareness cycle is validated by the dependency map. The remote access path is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The awareness cycle is reviewed against the commissioning document. The cloud baseline is compared with the dependency map. The access review process is measured against the agreed service level. The awareness cycle is documented alongside the current written standard. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The access review process is reviewed against the dependency map. The remote access path is traced to the current written standard. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The encryption standard is reconciled with the dependency map. The remote access path is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The mobile standard is traced to the most recent exercise record. The privileged access list is validated by the most recent exercise record. The identity lifecycle is reviewed against the current written standard. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The cloud baseline is traced to the most recent exercise record. The mobile standard is traced to the quarterly review notes. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

Each administrative account is validated by the ticket history for the period. The vendor register is traced to the dependency map. The continuity plan is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. The identity lifecycle is reconciled with the register of exceptions. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

- Owner named and recorded in the register.
- Review date scheduled and visible.
- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.

6. The classification scheme

The endpoint baseline is documented alongside the approved design baseline. The classification scheme is reconciled with the register of exceptions. The threat model is reconciled with the commissioning document. Every internet-facing service is checked against the most recent exercise record. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The vendor register is compared with the ticket history for the period. The recovery test is compared with the signed exception log. The encryption standard is evidenced by the previous year's assessment. The mobile standard is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The hardened build is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The vendor register is evidenced by the approved design baseline. The risk register is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The remote access path is compared with the current written standard. The endpoint baseline is validated by the register of exceptions. The monitoring pipeline is documented alongside the current written standard. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The endpoint baseline is measured against the quarterly review notes. Every internet-facing service is reconciled with the dependency map. Each administrative account is traced to the agreed service level. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The classification scheme is traced to the approved design baseline. The physical controls is reviewed against the approved design baseline. Every internet-facing service is traced to the quarterly review notes. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The patch calendar is measured against the dependency map. The email authentication record is documented alongside the register of exceptions. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The backup rotation is traced to the most recent exercise record. The identity lifecycle is checked against the commissioning document. The asset register is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The email authentication record is compared with the signed exception log. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The identity lifecycle is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The asset register is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The patch calendar is validated by the ticket history for the period. The metric set is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. The identity lifecycle is compared with the signed exception log. The cloud baseline is reviewed against the most recent exercise record. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The threat model is reconciled with the commissioning document. The asset register is reconciled with the register of exceptions. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The risk register is compared with the current written standard. The mobile standard is evidenced by the evidence pack held by the owner. The mobile standard is reviewed against the signed exception log. The hardened build is validated by the dependency map. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The third-party register is reviewed against the approved design baseline. The segmentation boundary is checked against the approved design baseline. The patch calendar is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The backup rotation is measured against the most recent exercise record. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The physical controls is measured against the agreed service level. The awareness cycle is validated by the approved design baseline. The risk register is reviewed against the most recent exercise record. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The recovery test is measured against the commissioning document. The risk register is evidenced by the commissioning document. The metric set is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The vendor register is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. The endpoint baseline is validated by the signed exception log. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The classification scheme is traced to the current written standard. The email authentication record is compared with the current written standard. The endpoint baseline is evidenced by the current written standard. The backup rotation is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The patch calendar is traced to the signed exception log. The classification scheme is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. The change process is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. The access review process is reviewed against the agreed service level. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The access review process is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. The hardened build is reviewed against the register of exceptions. The access review process is measured against the quarterly review notes. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The classification scheme is checked against the ticket history for the period. The third-party register is measured against the quarterly review notes. The remote access path is reconciled with the signed exception log. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The hardened build is compared with the dependency map. The segmentation boundary is validated by the ticket history for the period. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.
- Review date scheduled and visible.
- Exception route documented and time-bound.

The asset register is compared with the signed exception log. The patch calendar is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The vulnerability queue is documented alongside the signed exception log. Every internet-facing service is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. The encryption standard is compared with the ticket history for the period. The identity lifecycle is documented alongside the current written standard. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The metric set is documented alongside the dependency map. The monitoring pipeline is reconciled with the approved design baseline. The email authentication record is documented alongside the dependency map. The cloud baseline is documented alongside the evidence pack held by the owner. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The email authentication record is validated by the quarterly review notes. The vendor register is reviewed against the commissioning document. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The email authentication record is reviewed against the current written standard. The recovery test is validated by the ticket history for the period. The continuity plan is traced to the commissioning document. The hardened build is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The asset register is validated by the commissioning document. The monitoring pipeline is compared with the current written standard. The segmentation boundary is traced to the agreed service level. The risk register is measured against the commissioning document. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The asset register is measured against the approved design baseline. The segmentation boundary is checked against the previous year's assessment. The physical controls is reviewed against the approved design baseline. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The recovery test is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. The asset register is checked against the current written standard. The change process is evidenced by the evidence pack held by the owner. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

Every internet-facing service is documented alongside the commissioning document. The metric set is checked against the most recent exercise record. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The vendor register is validated by the dependency map. The metric set is traced to the register of exceptions. The remote access path is traced to the ticket history for the period. The recovery test is reconciled with the agreed service level. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

7. The monitoring pipeline

The monitoring pipeline is checked against the register of exceptions. The hardened build is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. The vulnerability queue is reviewed against the dependency map. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The vulnerability queue is validated by the signed exception log. Every internet-facing service is measured against the approved design baseline. Each administrative account is compared with the current written standard. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The threat model is evidenced by the register of exceptions. Each administrative account is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. The endpoint baseline is compared with the register of exceptions. The backup rotation is compared with the quarterly review notes. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The asset register is traced to the most recent exercise record. The vendor register is traced to the register of exceptions. The risk register is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. The awareness cycle is validated by the register of exceptions. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

8. The risk register

The risk register is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. The metric set is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The identity lifecycle is validated by the signed exception log. The mobile standard is traced to the agreed service level. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Notification list confirmed before execution.
- Evidence stored in the shared evidence pack.

The remote access path is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The asset register is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. The hardened build is reviewed against the dependency map. The retention schedule is validated by the register of exceptions. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The privileged access list is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. The retention schedule is reviewed against the agreed service level. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The retention schedule is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The continuity plan is evidenced by the dependency map. The patch calendar is evidenced by the signed exception log. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The vendor register is compared with the register of exceptions. The endpoint baseline is compared with the current written standard. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The encryption standard is evidenced by the register of exceptions. Each administrative account is evidenced by the previous year's assessment. The change process is documented alongside the current written standard. The access review process is reviewed against the approved design baseline. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

- Notification list confirmed before execution.
- Review date scheduled and visible.
- Test result attached to the record.
- Backup of the change retained for rollback.
- Dependencies mapped before changes are approved.

The monitoring pipeline is compared with the most recent exercise record. The asset register is traced to the most recent exercise record. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

Each administrative account is measured against the quarterly review notes. The threat model is compared with the dependency map. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

- Escalation path agreed with the service owner.
- Backup of the change retained for rollback.
- Review date scheduled and visible.

The metric set is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. The metric set is traced to the most recent exercise record. The mobile standard is evidenced by the dependency map. The asset register is measured against the evidence pack held by the owner. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The cloud baseline is compared with the register of exceptions. The threat model is documented alongside the commissioning document. The asset register is reconciled with the register of exceptions. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The identity lifecycle is traced to the current written standard. The physical controls is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. The classification scheme is compared with the ticket history for the period. The identity lifecycle is measured against the signed exception log. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The third-party register is reviewed against the dependency map. The recovery test is reviewed against the register of exceptions. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

Every internet-facing service is reviewed against the approved design baseline. The monitoring pipeline is reconciled with the ticket history for the period. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The retention schedule is validated by the signed exception log. The classification scheme is compared with the register of exceptions. The change process is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The endpoint baseline is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. The backup rotation is documented alongside the approved design baseline. The hardened build is reviewed against the dependency map. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The vulnerability queue is reconciled with the agreed service level. The awareness cycle is checked against the previous year's assessment. The threat model is traced to the commissioning document. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The risk register is reconciled with the register of exceptions. The remote access path is measured against the quarterly review notes. The physical controls is traced to the previous year's assessment. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The vulnerability queue is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. The mobile standard is traced to the ticket history for the period. The monitoring pipeline is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. Every internet-facing service is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The vulnerability queue is validated by the dependency map. The vendor register is documented alongside the agreed service level. The continuity plan is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The remote access path is documented alongside the evidence pack held by the owner. The hardened build is evidenced by the register of exceptions. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The physical controls is checked against the most recent exercise record. The encryption standard is compared with the most recent exercise record. The vendor register is traced to the dependency map. The recovery test is evidenced by the agreed service level. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

Each administrative account is checked against the ticket history for the period. The privileged access list is measured against the commissioning document. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The endpoint baseline is validated by the dependency map. The encryption standard is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The access review process is reconciled with the current written standard. The monitoring pipeline is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The change process is traced to the commissioning document. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The asset register is traced to the register of exceptions. The awareness cycle is traced to the agreed service level. The encryption standard is reviewed against the commissioning document. The remote access path is traced to the dependency map. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The recovery test is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The identity lifecycle is checked against the register of exceptions. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The vulnerability queue is validated by the most recent exercise record. The encryption standard is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The hardened build is reviewed against the approved design baseline. The recovery test is measured against the approved design baseline. The identity lifecycle is traced to the signed exception log. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The cloud baseline is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. The encryption standard is evidenced by the signed exception log. The classification scheme is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. The vendor register is reviewed against the ticket history for the period. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The change process is measured against the agreed service level. The physical controls is evidenced by the current written standard. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The asset register is compared with the current written standard. The backup rotation is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. The awareness cycle is measured against the dependency map. The retention schedule is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The third-party register is reconciled with the current written standard. The retention schedule is reviewed against the signed exception log. The third-party register is measured against the previous year's assessment. The backup rotation is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The mobile standard is compared with the signed exception log. The classification scheme is validated by the previous year's assessment. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The encryption standard is measured against the previous year's assessment. The risk register is evidenced by the register of exceptions. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

Each administrative account is checked against the most recent exercise record. The cloud baseline is reconciled with the register of exceptions. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The privileged access list is reconciled with the signed exception log. The email authentication record is measured against the ticket history for the period. The backup rotation is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The classification scheme is reviewed against the ticket history for the period. The risk register is validated by the agreed service level. The retention schedule is traced to the register of exceptions. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The metric set is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. The privileged access list is traced to the commissioning document. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

Each administrative account is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. The physical controls is validated by the agreed service level. The mobile standard is validated by the signed exception log. The hardened build is compared with the ticket history for the period. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The endpoint baseline is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. The physical controls is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. Every internet-facing service is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. The recovery test is checked against the register of exceptions. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

- Test result attached to the record.
- Backup of the change retained for rollback.
- Review date scheduled and visible.
- Escalation path agreed with the service owner.
- Notification list confirmed before execution.

Each administrative account is checked against the quarterly review notes. The continuity plan is checked against the approved design baseline. The backup rotation is measured against the previous year's assessment. The metric set is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The monitoring pipeline is traced to the signed exception log. The privileged access list is documented alongside the commissioning document. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The monitoring pipeline is traced to the register of exceptions. The risk register is traced to the current written standard. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The change process is evidenced by the previous year's assessment. The remote access path is evidenced by the agreed service level. The asset register is checked against the previous year's assessment. The vulnerability queue is reviewed against the agreed service level. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The retention schedule is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. Each administrative account is measured against the ticket history for the period. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The retention schedule is compared with the commissioning document. The threat model is traced to the dependency map. Every internet-facing service is measured against the agreed service level. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The recovery test is traced to the most recent exercise record. The endpoint baseline is validated by the ticket history for the period. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The mobile standard is measured against the commissioning document. The change process is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The segmentation boundary is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. The vendor register is reviewed against the most recent exercise record. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The endpoint baseline is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. The physical controls is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. The endpoint baseline is documented alongside the signed exception log. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The hardened build is validated by the commissioning document. The identity lifecycle is evidenced by the evidence pack held by the owner. The physical controls is checked against the current written standard. The vendor register is measured against the previous year's assessment. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The encryption standard is traced to the most recent exercise record. The third-party register is reconciled with the current written standard. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

Each administrative account is traced to the previous year's assessment. The vendor register is checked against the ticket history for the period. The endpoint baseline is validated by the quarterly review notes. The threat model is checked against the previous year's assessment. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The patch calendar is reconciled with the approved design baseline. The classification scheme is reviewed against the agreed service level. The retention schedule is traced to the quarterly review notes. The access review process is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The hardened build is checked against the agreed service level. The recovery test is documented alongside the signed exception log. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The patch calendar is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. The change process is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. The third-party register is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The identity lifecycle is traced to the register of exceptions. Every internet-facing service is documented alongside the commissioning document. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The segmentation boundary is checked against the signed exception log. The threat model is checked against the approved design baseline. The patch calendar is compared with the signed exception log. The change process is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

9. The vulnerability queue

The classification scheme is traced to the ticket history for the period. The retention schedule is validated by the commissioning document. The endpoint baseline is traced to the ticket history for the period. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The patch calendar is traced to the most recent exercise record. The remote access path is evidenced by the signed exception log. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The physical controls is reviewed against the commissioning document. The continuity plan is documented alongside the current written standard. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The segmentation boundary is evidenced by the commissioning document. The classification scheme is reviewed against the approved design baseline. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The awareness cycle is checked against the previous year's assessment. The recovery test is documented alongside the register of exceptions. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

10. The physical controls

The vendor register is traced to the quarterly review notes. The patch calendar is traced to the agreed service level. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The patch calendar is checked against the dependency map. The backup rotation is validated by the previous year's assessment. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The endpoint baseline is reviewed against the signed exception log. The awareness cycle is checked against the register of exceptions. The threat model is measured against the register of exceptions. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The segmentation boundary is measured against the commissioning document. The risk register is compared with the ticket history for the period. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The retention schedule is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. The metric set is validated by the quarterly review notes. The change process is reviewed against the signed exception log. The asset register is measured against the quarterly review notes. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The risk register is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. The cloud baseline is measured against the register of exceptions. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The access review process is measured against the quarterly review notes. The access review process is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. The risk register is compared with the dependency map. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The vendor register is traced to the approved design baseline. The hardened build is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

12. The email authentication record

The monitoring pipeline is reviewed against the most recent exercise record. The asset register is evidenced by the approved design baseline. The access review process is reconciled with the register of exceptions. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

13. The segmentation boundary

The monitoring pipeline is evidenced by the approved design baseline. The change process is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The identity lifecycle is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. The hardened build is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The change process is checked against the commissioning document. The change process is checked against the register of exceptions. The risk register is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The remote access path is reconciled with the dependency map. The risk register is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. The monitoring pipeline is reviewed against the dependency map. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The cloud baseline is reconciled with the commissioning document. The endpoint baseline is measured against the signed exception log. The segmentation boundary is validated by the current written standard. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The change process is traced to the register of exceptions. The backup rotation is reconciled with the commissioning document. The continuity plan is compared with the most recent exercise record. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The risk register is traced to the register of exceptions. The vendor register is checked against the previous year's assessment. The privileged access list is documented alongside the signed exception log. The patch calendar is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

Every internet-facing service is compared with the agreed service level. The email authentication record is measured against the approved design baseline. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The endpoint baseline is evidenced by the evidence pack held by the owner. The vulnerability queue is reconciled with the dependency map. The vulnerability queue is reconciled with the commissioning document. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

14. The awareness cycle

The vulnerability queue is reconciled with the current written standard. The encryption standard is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. The identity lifecycle is traced to the agreed service level. The metric set is compared with the commissioning document. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The remote access path is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. The recovery test is traced to the commissioning document. The awareness cycle is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. The patch calendar is evidenced by the quarterly review notes. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The awareness cycle is traced to the most recent exercise record. The classification scheme is evidenced by the evidence pack held by the owner. The metric set is validated by the commissioning document. The vulnerability queue is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The mobile standard is measured against the quarterly review notes. The mobile standard is evidenced by the evidence pack held by the owner. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

15. The threat model

The third-party register is traced to the quarterly review notes. The patch calendar is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

- Dependencies mapped before changes are approved.
- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Evidence stored in the shared evidence pack.

The monitoring pipeline is evidenced by the approved design baseline. The encryption standard is validated by the approved design baseline. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

- Dependencies mapped before changes are approved.
- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Evidence stored in the shared evidence pack.
- Owner named and recorded in the register.

The retention schedule is validated by the signed exception log. The change process is evidenced by the quarterly review notes. The privileged access list is checked against the agreed service level. The asset register is documented alongside the current written standard. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

Every internet-facing service is reviewed against the approved design baseline. The patch calendar is validated by the approved design baseline. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

16. The backup rotation

The mobile standard is checked against the signed exception log. The threat model is traced to the quarterly review notes. The metric set is documented alongside the ticket history for the period. The vendor register is evidenced by the quarterly review notes. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The metric set is documented alongside the dependency map. The encryption standard is traced to the current written standard. The encryption standard is reviewed against the agreed service level. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The cloud baseline is validated by the approved design baseline. The recovery test is compared with the agreed service level. The encryption standard is compared with the register of exceptions. The metric set is compared with the most recent exercise record. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The retention schedule is validated by the ticket history for the period. The encryption standard is checked against the current written standard. The patch calendar is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The vendor register is reviewed against the signed exception log. The metric set is reviewed against the most recent exercise record. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

17. The change process

The remote access path is traced to the approved design baseline. Every internet-facing service is validated by the register of exceptions. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

18. The vendor register

The physical controls is compared with the most recent exercise record. Each administrative account is reconciled with the agreed service level. The vendor register is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. The risk register is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The email authentication record is measured against the ticket history for the period. The retention schedule is measured against the ticket history for the period. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The encryption standard is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The cloud baseline is validated by the quarterly review notes. The mobile standard is compared with the signed exception log. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The email authentication record is compared with the agreed service level. The continuity plan is measured against the current written standard. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The vendor register is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The third-party register is compared with the ticket history for the period. The monitoring pipeline is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. The cloud baseline is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The vulnerability queue is checked against the register of exceptions. The hardened build is evidenced by the approved design baseline. The access review process is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The hardened build is validated by the register of exceptions. The change process is reconciled with the dependency map. The remote access path is validated by the previous year's assessment. The backup rotation is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The metric set is reviewed against the ticket history for the period. The mobile standard is measured against the dependency map. The awareness cycle is compared with the dependency map. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The change process is reviewed against the approved design baseline. The metric set is compared with the dependency map. The vendor register is checked against the quarterly review notes. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The threat model is checked against the previous year's assessment. Every internet-facing service is checked against the current written standard. The mobile standard is documented alongside the agreed service level. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

19. The access review process

The retention schedule is evidenced by the signed exception log. Each administrative account is compared with the ticket history for the period. The email authentication record is checked against the dependency map. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The awareness cycle is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. The encryption standard is documented alongside the current written standard. The segmentation boundary is traced to the ticket history for the period. The vulnerability queue is checked against the register of exceptions. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

20. The physical controls

The email authentication record is compared with the signed exception log. The asset register is evidenced by the current written standard. The risk register is traced to the commissioning document. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The third-party register is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The third-party register is measured against the signed exception log. The metric set is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The email authentication record is reconciled with the current written standard. The email authentication record is validated by the most recent exercise record. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The metric set is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. The segmentation boundary is compared with the signed exception log. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Notification list confirmed before execution.
- Owner named and recorded in the register.

The awareness cycle is traced to the agreed service level. The vulnerability queue is traced to the dependency map. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

Every internet-facing service is traced to the commissioning document. The vulnerability queue is checked against the previous year's assessment. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

21. The identity lifecycle

The risk register is validated by the dependency map. The change process is measured against the quarterly review notes. The classification scheme is checked against the approved design baseline. The monitoring pipeline is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The vulnerability queue is traced to the approved design baseline. The risk register is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. The third-party register is traced to the agreed service level. The awareness cycle is checked against the commissioning document. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The vendor register is checked against the previous year's assessment. The endpoint baseline is traced to the previous year's assessment. The change process is compared with the quarterly review notes. The cloud baseline is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

Each administrative account is traced to the dependency map. The encryption standard is documented alongside the evidence pack held by the owner. The third-party register is checked against the previous year's assessment. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The physical controls is validated by the previous year's assessment. The awareness cycle is documented alongside the approved design baseline. The access review process is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. The mobile standard is checked against the agreed service level. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The vulnerability queue is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. The segmentation boundary is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The backup rotation is checked against the current written standard. The backup rotation is reviewed against the signed exception log. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The awareness cycle is compared with the dependency map. The patch calendar is validated by the current written standard. Every internet-facing service is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The segmentation boundary is compared with the dependency map. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The vulnerability queue is validated by the most recent exercise record. The access review process is validated by the quarterly review notes. The remote access path is reviewed against the dependency map. The segmentation boundary is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The cloud baseline is validated by the ticket history for the period. Every internet-facing service is evidenced by the quarterly review notes. The vulnerability queue is checked against the most recent exercise record. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The endpoint baseline is validated by the signed exception log. The physical controls is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.
- Owner named and recorded in the register.
- Escalation path agreed with the service owner.
- Notification list confirmed before execution.

22. The change process

The email authentication record is reviewed against the current written standard. The privileged access list is checked against the previous year's assessment. The retention schedule is checked against the quarterly review notes. The vulnerability queue is reconciled with the commissioning document. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The mobile standard is checked against the current written standard. The metric set is reviewed against the register of exceptions. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The threat model is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. The classification scheme is evidenced by the evidence pack held by the owner. The change process is validated by the previous year's assessment. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.
- Evidence stored in the shared evidence pack.
- Backup of the change retained for rollback.
- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Notification list confirmed before execution.

The retention schedule is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The email authentication record is checked against the agreed service level. The third-party register is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.