Remote Access Programme

Exercise record 23 pages

CYBR-STRESS-004

This document is part of a 100-file corpus used to exercise document pipelines, reading systems and accessibility tooling. Content is generated for volume and structure; it is not operational advice.

The mobile standard is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. The hardened build is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. The change process is measured against the previous year's assessment. The asset register is reviewed against the current written standard. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The privileged access list is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. The encryption standard is compared with the register of exceptions. The monitoring pipeline is documented alongside the ticket history for the period. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The monitoring pipeline is checked against the most recent exercise record. The endpoint baseline is documented alongside the commissioning document. The hardened build is compared with the quarterly review notes. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The awareness cycle is checked against the dependency map. The identity lifecycle is measured against the evidence pack held by the owner. The segmentation boundary is traced to the most recent exercise record. The remote access path is reconciled with the dependency map. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The vulnerability queue is compared with the signed exception log. The metric set is evidenced by the previous year's assessment. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The remote access path is evidenced by the previous year's assessment. The continuity plan is evidenced by the commissioning document. Each administrative account is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. The recovery test is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The privileged access list is measured against the agreed service level. Each administrative account is checked against the commissioning document. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The email authentication record is compared with the ticket history for the period. The risk register is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. The monitoring pipeline is validated by the most recent exercise record. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The patch calendar is reconciled with the signed exception log. The monitoring pipeline is reconciled with the commissioning document. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The asset register is traced to the quarterly review notes. The remote access path is validated by the dependency map. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

Each administrative account is evidenced by the quarterly review notes. The vulnerability queue is reviewed against the ticket history for the period. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The risk register is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. Every internet-facing service is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. The risk register is documented alongside the ticket history for the period. The access review process is measured against the current written standard. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The hardened build is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. The patch calendar is validated by the signed exception log. The metric set is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. Each administrative account is measured against the quarterly review notes. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The third-party register is measured against the previous year's assessment. The third-party register is documented alongside the commissioning document. The vendor register is reviewed against the commissioning document. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The classification scheme is validated by the most recent exercise record. The remote access path is validated by the register of exceptions. The vulnerability queue is checked against the most recent exercise record. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The vulnerability queue is compared with the signed exception log. The third-party register is evidenced by the approved design baseline. Every internet-facing service is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. The encryption standard is measured against the dependency map. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

- Evidence stored in the shared evidence pack.
- Dependencies mapped before changes are approved.
- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.

The hardened build is checked against the agreed service level. The patch calendar is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

1. Every internet-facing service

The monitoring pipeline is evidenced by the previous year's assessment. The vulnerability queue is traced to the ticket history for the period. The vulnerability queue is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. The segmentation boundary is traced to the signed exception log. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The metric set is documented alongside the commissioning document. The mobile standard is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. The change process is evidenced by the previous year's assessment. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The metric set is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. The physical controls is compared with the quarterly review notes. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The cloud baseline is reviewed against the most recent exercise record. The encryption standard is measured against the quarterly review notes. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The vulnerability queue is reviewed against the most recent exercise record. The monitoring pipeline is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. The vendor register is reconciled with the register of exceptions. The vendor register is traced to the commissioning document. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The change process is checked against the quarterly review notes. The access review process is compared with the commissioning document. The vendor register is documented alongside the approved design baseline. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The metric set is traced to the signed exception log. The metric set is checked against the quarterly review notes. The change process is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The continuity plan is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The awareness cycle is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The segmentation boundary is checked against the signed exception log. The classification scheme is checked against the dependency map. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The physical controls is compared with the previous year's assessment. The risk register is checked against the most recent exercise record. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

- Dependencies mapped before changes are approved.
- Test result attached to the record.
- Notification list confirmed before execution.
- Owner named and recorded in the register.
- Exception route documented and time-bound.

2. The encryption standard

Every internet-facing service is reconciled with the approved design baseline. The physical controls is evidenced by the approved design baseline. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The change process is evidenced by the signed exception log. Each administrative account is validated by the previous year's assessment. The hardened build is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

Each administrative account is reviewed against the most recent exercise record. The vendor register is validated by the previous year's assessment. The monitoring pipeline is measured against the current written standard. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The endpoint baseline is compared with the agreed service level. The retention schedule is measured against the agreed service level. The backup rotation is checked against the previous year's assessment. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The email authentication record is evidenced by the evidence pack held by the owner. The monitoring pipeline is compared with the register of exceptions. The vulnerability queue is traced to the commissioning document. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The asset register is validated by the agreed service level. The email authentication record is compared with the commissioning document. The vulnerability queue is traced to the approved design baseline. The threat model is reconciled with the signed exception log. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

Every internet-facing service is documented alongside the current written standard. The change process is compared with the most recent exercise record. The identity lifecycle is measured against the approved design baseline. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The endpoint baseline is checked against the dependency map. The classification scheme is traced to the current written standard. The metric set is reconciled with the commissioning document. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The encryption standard is measured against the quarterly review notes. The change process is compared with the quarterly review notes. The risk register is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The awareness cycle is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. The monitoring pipeline is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. The monitoring pipeline is validated by the previous year's assessment. Each administrative account is traced to the current written standard. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The cloud baseline is evidenced by the quarterly review notes. The risk register is reviewed against the signed exception log. The recovery test is documented alongside the register of exceptions. The metric set is checked against the dependency map. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

Every internet-facing service is validated by the ticket history for the period. The privileged access list is reviewed against the ticket history for the period. The identity lifecycle is traced to the current written standard. The cloud baseline is measured against the commissioning document. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

Every internet-facing service is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. The retention schedule is checked against the register of exceptions. The mobile standard is reconciled with the approved design baseline. The identity lifecycle is documented alongside the evidence pack held by the owner. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The email authentication record is compared with the agreed service level. The cloud baseline is validated by the dependency map. The identity lifecycle is traced to the previous year's assessment. Each administrative account is checked against the quarterly review notes. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The asset register is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. The hardened build is compared with the commissioning document. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The endpoint baseline is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. The endpoint baseline is validated by the commissioning document. Every internet-facing service is measured against the evidence pack held by the owner. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

Each administrative account is checked against the commissioning document. The third-party register is documented alongside the current written standard. The continuity plan is traced to the most recent exercise record. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The remote access path is compared with the previous year's assessment. The monitoring pipeline is traced to the approved design baseline. The retention schedule is validated by the commissioning document. The segmentation boundary is reviewed against the dependency map. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.
- Escalation path agreed with the service owner.
- Dependencies mapped before changes are approved.
- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Notification list confirmed before execution.

The change process is measured against the register of exceptions. The change process is compared with the ticket history for the period. The endpoint baseline is measured against the register of exceptions. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The threat model is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. The endpoint baseline is measured against the register of exceptions. The access review process is checked against the register of exceptions. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The physical controls is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. The hardened build is reviewed against the ticket history for the period. The threat model is traced to the quarterly review notes. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The vendor register is documented alongside the current written standard. The awareness cycle is traced to the dependency map. The patch calendar is reviewed against the signed exception log. The identity lifecycle is reviewed against the agreed service level. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The threat model is reconciled with the register of exceptions. The awareness cycle is checked against the signed exception log. The metric set is evidenced by the quarterly review notes. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

Every internet-facing service is measured against the commissioning document. The hardened build is compared with the signed exception log. The physical controls is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

3. The segmentation boundary

The privileged access list is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. The remote access path is checked against the current written standard. The endpoint baseline is traced to the approved design baseline. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

- Owner named and recorded in the register.
- Escalation path agreed with the service owner.
- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Backup of the change retained for rollback.

The hardened build is evidenced by the dependency map. The monitoring pipeline is validated by the agreed service level. The monitoring pipeline is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The endpoint baseline is documented alongside the signed exception log. The segmentation boundary is compared with the register of exceptions. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The recovery test is measured against the agreed service level. The backup rotation is reviewed against the register of exceptions. Each administrative account is documented alongside the ticket history for the period. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The asset register is reviewed against the dependency map. The identity lifecycle is evidenced by the quarterly review notes. The segmentation boundary is documented alongside the dependency map. Each administrative account is checked against the current written standard. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The recovery test is reviewed against the current written standard. The privileged access list is validated by the commissioning document. The identity lifecycle is checked against the ticket history for the period. The recovery test is reviewed against the signed exception log. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The vendor register is traced to the most recent exercise record. The privileged access list is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. The privileged access list is compared with the dependency map. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The awareness cycle is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. The cloud baseline is traced to the current written standard. The patch calendar is evidenced by the dependency map. The physical controls is reconciled with the current written standard. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

- Evidence stored in the shared evidence pack.
- Notification list confirmed before execution.
- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.

The backup rotation is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. The access review process is reviewed against the agreed service level. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The identity lifecycle is evidenced by the approved design baseline. The endpoint baseline is validated by the approved design baseline. The hardened build is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The segmentation boundary is checked against the agreed service level. The awareness cycle is measured against the register of exceptions. The privileged access list is reconciled with the approved design baseline. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The vulnerability queue is traced to the current written standard. The vendor register is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. The change process is validated by the register of exceptions. The email authentication record is compared with the signed exception log. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

- Review date scheduled and visible.
- Evidence stored in the shared evidence pack.
- Notification list confirmed before execution.
- Owner named and recorded in the register.
- Test result attached to the record.

The segmentation boundary is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. The recovery test is documented alongside the quarterly review notes. The vulnerability queue is evidenced by the current written standard. The retention schedule is evidenced by the agreed service level. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The vulnerability queue is measured against the previous year's assessment. The mobile standard is evidenced by the signed exception log. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The vendor register is measured against the previous year's assessment. The threat model is reconciled with the approved design baseline. The awareness cycle is reconciled with the current written standard. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The monitoring pipeline is evidenced by the dependency map. The classification scheme is traced to the ticket history for the period. The change process is evidenced by the current written standard. The backup rotation is checked against the signed exception log. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The recovery test is validated by the most recent exercise record. The retention schedule is documented alongside the dependency map. The classification scheme is validated by the approved design baseline. The cloud baseline is documented alongside the register of exceptions. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The privileged access list is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. The identity lifecycle is documented alongside the agreed service level. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The access review process is compared with the quarterly review notes. The vulnerability queue is measured against the current written standard. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The threat model is compared with the most recent exercise record. Every internet-facing service is traced to the quarterly review notes. The monitoring pipeline is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The hardened build is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The vulnerability queue is reconciled with the current written standard. The backup rotation is reconciled with the commissioning document. The retention schedule is reconciled with the agreed service level. The vendor register is documented alongside the approved design baseline. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

Every internet-facing service is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The remote access path is traced to the approved design baseline. The monitoring pipeline is evidenced by the agreed service level. The remote access path is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The awareness cycle is checked against the signed exception log. The privileged access list is traced to the register of exceptions. The mobile standard is measured against the commissioning document. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The awareness cycle is reconciled with the current written standard. The cloud baseline is reconciled with the agreed service level. The mobile standard is checked against the signed exception log. The identity lifecycle is compared with the dependency map. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The access review process is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. The monitoring pipeline is checked against the register of exceptions. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The segmentation boundary is traced to the ticket history for the period. The privileged access list is reconciled with the register of exceptions. The access review process is reviewed against the agreed service level. The cloud baseline is reconciled with the dependency map. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The threat model is measured against the signed exception log. The segmentation boundary is traced to the commissioning document. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The change process is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. The backup rotation is measured against the agreed service level. The access review process is validated by the most recent exercise record. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The recovery test is measured against the most recent exercise record. Every internet-facing service is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. The risk register is validated by the approved design baseline. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The recovery test is documented alongside the approved design baseline. The vendor register is validated by the quarterly review notes. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The change process is measured against the agreed service level. The patch calendar is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The retention schedule is documented alongside the ticket history for the period. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The email authentication record is reconciled with the register of exceptions. The hardened build is checked against the previous year's assessment. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The remote access path is traced to the commissioning document. The metric set is traced to the signed exception log. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The classification scheme is reconciled with the current written standard. Every internet-facing service is compared with the dependency map. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

Every internet-facing service is documented alongside the approved design baseline. The risk register is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. The hardened build is measured against the quarterly review notes. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The backup rotation is checked against the previous year's assessment. The continuity plan is evidenced by the signed exception log. The remote access path is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

4. Each administrative account

The access review process is checked against the ticket history for the period. The remote access path is evidenced by the signed exception log. The hardened build is checked against the commissioning document. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The retention schedule is checked against the dependency map. The monitoring pipeline is reconciled with the signed exception log. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Dependencies mapped before changes are approved.
- Evidence stored in the shared evidence pack.
- Escalation path agreed with the service owner.
- Test result attached to the record.

The change process is traced to the ticket history for the period. The backup rotation is evidenced by the current written standard. The access review process is documented alongside the ticket history for the period. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The hardened build is compared with the approved design baseline. Every internet-facing service is compared with the register of exceptions. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The backup rotation is reviewed against the agreed service level. The vendor register is documented alongside the dependency map. The email authentication record is measured against the agreed service level. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The physical controls is measured against the agreed service level. The retention schedule is validated by the current written standard. The mobile standard is validated by the previous year's assessment. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The privileged access list is reconciled with the register of exceptions. The segmentation boundary is documented alongside the register of exceptions. The cloud baseline is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The retention schedule is validated by the approved design baseline. The metric set is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. The retention schedule is reviewed against the approved design baseline. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

- Owner named and recorded in the register.
- Review date scheduled and visible.
- Dependencies mapped before changes are approved.

The asset register is validated by the agreed service level. The recovery test is reviewed against the agreed service level. The patch calendar is reconciled with the register of exceptions. Each administrative account is checked against the current written standard. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The threat model is traced to the current written standard. The vulnerability queue is checked against the register of exceptions. The hardened build is compared with the approved design baseline. The encryption standard is evidenced by the agreed service level. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The hardened build is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. The backup rotation is traced to the approved design baseline. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The recovery test is compared with the previous year's assessment. The email authentication record is traced to the previous year's assessment. The metric set is compared with the ticket history for the period. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The segmentation boundary is measured against the most recent exercise record. The patch calendar is traced to the approved design baseline. The asset register is traced to the quarterly review notes. The cloud baseline is documented alongside the current written standard. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The encryption standard is measured against the evidence pack held by the owner. The patch calendar is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The encryption standard is reviewed against the approved design baseline. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The vendor register is compared with the ticket history for the period. The backup rotation is traced to the signed exception log. The metric set is compared with the register of exceptions. The risk register is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The physical controls is evidenced by the commissioning document. The access review process is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. The retention schedule is documented alongside the dependency map. The metric set is evidenced by the current written standard. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The threat model is measured against the ticket history for the period. Every internet-facing service is validated by the dependency map. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

5. The third-party register

Each administrative account is validated by the approved design baseline. The change process is checked against the quarterly review notes. The backup rotation is traced to the dependency map. The remote access path is evidenced by the agreed service level. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The hardened build is reconciled with the agreed service level. The segmentation boundary is traced to the dependency map. The segmentation boundary is traced to the most recent exercise record. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

6. The awareness cycle

Each administrative account is checked against the quarterly review notes. Each administrative account is checked against the dependency map. The physical controls is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The threat model is checked against the ticket history for the period. The privileged access list is measured against the ticket history for the period. The mobile standard is compared with the agreed service level. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The classification scheme is checked against the commissioning document. The change process is validated by the most recent exercise record. Every internet-facing service is measured against the ticket history for the period. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The identity lifecycle is evidenced by the dependency map. The physical controls is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The continuity plan is validated by the dependency map. The retention schedule is reconciled with the signed exception log. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The monitoring pipeline is validated by the approved design baseline. The segmentation boundary is evidenced by the dependency map. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The classification scheme is traced to the current written standard. The continuity plan is traced to the most recent exercise record. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

Each administrative account is compared with the agreed service level. The access review process is measured against the dependency map. The threat model is traced to the current written standard. The encryption standard is compared with the register of exceptions. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The threat model is checked against the signed exception log. The risk register is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The awareness cycle is measured against the approved design baseline. The monitoring pipeline is documented alongside the agreed service level. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The physical controls is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. The remote access path is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The endpoint baseline is reviewed against the register of exceptions. Each administrative account is compared with the agreed service level. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Test result attached to the record.
- Evidence stored in the shared evidence pack.
- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.
- Backup of the change retained for rollback.

Each administrative account is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. The change process is compared with the register of exceptions. The access review process is traced to the quarterly review notes. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The vendor register is traced to the dependency map. The segmentation boundary is reconciled with the agreed service level. The vulnerability queue is traced to the register of exceptions. The remote access path is measured against the ticket history for the period. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The vendor register is documented alongside the agreed service level. The change process is measured against the current written standard. The continuity plan is reconciled with the quarterly review notes. Each administrative account is checked against the approved design baseline. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

7. The threat model

The classification scheme is reviewed against the previous year's assessment. The remote access path is documented alongside the current written standard. The patch calendar is measured against the previous year's assessment. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The privileged access list is traced to the current written standard. The physical controls is checked against the agreed service level. The threat model is measured against the ticket history for the period. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The identity lifecycle is measured against the previous year's assessment. The email authentication record is compared with the ticket history for the period. The risk register is checked against the quarterly review notes. The monitoring pipeline is evidenced by the dependency map. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The metric set is compared with the previous year's assessment. Every internet-facing service is reconciled with the most recent exercise record. Every internet-facing service is documented alongside the signed exception log. The metric set is measured against the most recent exercise record. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The asset register is traced to the register of exceptions. The recovery test is validated by the agreed service level. The backup rotation is traced to the approved design baseline. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

Every internet-facing service is documented alongside the commissioning document. The patch calendar is validated by the quarterly review notes. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The endpoint baseline is checked against the commissioning document. The change process is traced to the commissioning document. The metric set is compared with the approved design baseline. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The email authentication record is compared with the dependency map. The privileged access list is evidenced by the agreed service level. The endpoint baseline is evidenced by the current written standard. The endpoint baseline is checked against the signed exception log. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The encryption standard is documented alongside the agreed service level. The remote access path is reviewed against the ticket history for the period. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The vendor register is checked against the approved design baseline. The vendor register is traced to the commissioning document. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The monitoring pipeline is validated by the quarterly review notes. The change process is validated by the agreed service level. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The threat model is measured against the ticket history for the period. The retention schedule is measured against the agreed service level. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The identity lifecycle is documented alongside the register of exceptions. The cloud baseline is measured against the approved design baseline. The identity lifecycle is evidenced by the agreed service level. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The continuity plan is compared with the current written standard. The hardened build is compared with the previous year's assessment. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The backup rotation is validated by the current written standard. The backup rotation is validated by the register of exceptions. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The monitoring pipeline is evidenced by the approved design baseline. The hardened build is measured against the previous year's assessment. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The mobile standard is measured against the dependency map. The identity lifecycle is evidenced by the signed exception log. The awareness cycle is validated by the dependency map. The physical controls is evidenced by the current written standard. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

- Escalation path agreed with the service owner.
- Backup of the change retained for rollback.
- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.

The identity lifecycle is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. The remote access path is evidenced by the current written standard. The privileged access list is reviewed against the commissioning document. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The cloud baseline is documented alongside the agreed service level. The asset register is evidenced by the approved design baseline. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

8. The cloud baseline

The continuity plan is reviewed against the ticket history for the period. The metric set is measured against the commissioning document. The segmentation boundary is validated by the approved design baseline. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The metric set is documented alongside the dependency map. The hardened build is reconciled with the current written standard. The access review process is checked against the ticket history for the period. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The metric set is reviewed against the approved design baseline. The identity lifecycle is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

9. Every internet-facing service

The email authentication record is validated by the register of exceptions. The access review process is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

10. The threat model

11. The vendor register

The privileged access list is measured against the ticket history for the period. The vulnerability queue is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. The classification scheme is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

12. The asset register

The identity lifecycle is checked against the dependency map. The hardened build is checked against the signed exception log. The change process is measured against the approved design baseline. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The endpoint baseline is checked against the current written standard. The threat model is compared with the quarterly review notes. The cloud baseline is reconciled with the signed exception log. The classification scheme is traced to the signed exception log. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The change process is validated by the agreed service level. The privileged access list is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. The monitoring pipeline is measured against the ticket history for the period. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The identity lifecycle is validated by the dependency map. The classification scheme is validated by the previous year's assessment. The remote access path is checked against the commissioning document. The endpoint baseline is validated by the evidence pack held by the owner. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

13. The cloud baseline

The threat model is reconciled with the current written standard. The awareness cycle is documented alongside the register of exceptions. The segmentation boundary is documented alongside the evidence pack held by the owner. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

Every internet-facing service is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. The backup rotation is validated by the previous year's assessment. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The vulnerability queue is validated by the quarterly review notes. The mobile standard is measured against the quarterly review notes. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The classification scheme is validated by the current written standard. The remote access path is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The mobile standard is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The change process is checked against the commissioning document. The hardened build is reconciled with the agreed service level. Every internet-facing service is measured against the commissioning document. The threat model is measured against the most recent exercise record. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The awareness cycle is traced to the approved design baseline. The asset register is measured against the agreed service level. The mobile standard is reviewed against the approved design baseline. The third-party register is evidenced by the agreed service level. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The change process is reviewed against the dependency map. The threat model is reviewed against the ticket history for the period. The monitoring pipeline is traced to the quarterly review notes. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The email authentication record is measured against the current written standard. The vendor register is measured against the evidence pack held by the owner. The backup rotation is validated by the signed exception log. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

Each administrative account is documented alongside the ticket history for the period. The physical controls is reviewed against the agreed service level. The vendor register is measured against the commissioning document. The vulnerability queue is compared with the current written standard. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The vulnerability queue is validated by the most recent exercise record. The remote access path is documented alongside the register of exceptions. The physical controls is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. The recovery test is traced to the ticket history for the period. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The remote access path is measured against the previous year's assessment. The physical controls is evidenced by the ticket history for the period. The threat model is traced to the register of exceptions. Every internet-facing service is evidenced by the register of exceptions. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The awareness cycle is reconciled with the previous year's assessment. Each administrative account is compared with the dependency map. The asset register is reviewed against the signed exception log. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The risk register is measured against the approved design baseline. The remote access path is evidenced by the previous year's assessment. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The privileged access list is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The email authentication record is validated by the register of exceptions. The vendor register is documented alongside the dependency map. The encryption standard is evidenced by the register of exceptions. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

The awareness cycle is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. Every internet-facing service is measured against the dependency map. The backup rotation is evidenced by the signed exception log. Metrics are reported as trends rather than single data points.

The physical controls is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. The identity lifecycle is evidenced by the previous year's assessment. The vulnerability queue is evidenced by the dependency map. The physical controls is checked against the agreed service level. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

Each administrative account is traced to the dependency map. The encryption standard is evidenced by the agreed service level. The mobile standard is reconciled with the dependency map. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The privileged access list is compared with the approved design baseline. The physical controls is evidenced by the approved design baseline. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The identity lifecycle is checked against the ticket history for the period. The risk register is reviewed against the commissioning document. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The physical controls is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. The remote access path is documented alongside the commissioning document. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

14. The recovery test

The vulnerability queue is evidenced by the approved design baseline. The recovery test is traced to the register of exceptions. The continuity plan is validated by the most recent exercise record. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Evidence stored in the shared evidence pack.
- Test result attached to the record.

The monitoring pipeline is documented alongside the register of exceptions. The segmentation boundary is checked against the approved design baseline. The continuity plan is checked against the quarterly review notes. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The physical controls is validated by the signed exception log. The monitoring pipeline is checked against the register of exceptions. The asset register is reconciled with the dependency map. The risk register is compared with the signed exception log. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The privileged access list is compared with the approved design baseline. The patch calendar is compared with the dependency map. The privileged access list is measured against the agreed service level. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The backup rotation is measured against the approved design baseline. The threat model is validated by the signed exception log. The asset register is validated by the dependency map. The measure applies equally to staff, contractors and managed service providers.

The physical controls is compared with the commissioning document. The metric set is reconciled with the signed exception log. The asset register is checked against the approved design baseline. The identity lifecycle is traced to the register of exceptions. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

The remote access path is checked against the current written standard. The vendor register is traced to the ticket history for the period. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The encryption standard is validated by the commissioning document. Each administrative account is reviewed against the dependency map. The threat model is compared with the commissioning document. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The awareness cycle is reconciled with the approved design baseline. The hardened build is validated by the signed exception log. The classification scheme is compared with the commissioning document. The metric set is traced to the agreed service level. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The access review process is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. Each administrative account is traced to the approved design baseline. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The privileged access list is documented alongside the approved design baseline. The metric set is evidenced by the signed exception log. The cloud baseline is compared with the quarterly review notes. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The classification scheme is evidenced by the most recent exercise record. The privileged access list is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The cloud baseline is checked against the quarterly review notes. The risk register is documented alongside the ticket history for the period. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The recovery test is validated by the signed exception log. The awareness cycle is compared with the approved design baseline. The encryption standard is measured against the previous year's assessment. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

15. The classification scheme

The remote access path is reviewed against the most recent exercise record. The access review process is checked against the current written standard. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The email authentication record is reviewed against the register of exceptions. The cloud baseline is documented alongside the register of exceptions. Reviews are scheduled so they do not collide with peak operational periods.

The classification scheme is traced to the previous year's assessment. The awareness cycle is validated by the register of exceptions. The privileged access list is validated by the dependency map. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The access review process is compared with the ticket history for the period. The retention schedule is traced to the ticket history for the period. The patch calendar is documented alongside the current written standard. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The cloud baseline is reviewed against the agreed service level. The classification scheme is documented alongside the commissioning document. The vendor register is documented alongside the approved design baseline. The vulnerability queue is checked against the register of exceptions. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

The physical controls is documented alongside the signed exception log. The metric set is documented alongside the dependency map. The classification scheme is checked against the most recent exercise record. The patch calendar is documented alongside the signed exception log. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The continuity plan is checked against the evidence pack held by the owner. Each administrative account is traced to the previous year's assessment. The threat model is validated by the previous year's assessment. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

- Test result attached to the record.
- Dependencies mapped before changes are approved.
- Escalation path agreed with the service owner.

The vendor register is validated by the dependency map. Every internet-facing service is measured against the register of exceptions. Exceptions are costly by design: they expire and must be re-justified.

The endpoint baseline is reconciled with the approved design baseline. The access review process is documented alongside the most recent exercise record. The remote access path is reconciled with the evidence pack held by the owner. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The threat model is checked against the ticket history for the period. The vendor register is reconciled with the commissioning document. The remote access path is compared with the dependency map. The endpoint baseline is measured against the dependency map. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The remote access path is checked against the dependency map. Every internet-facing service is reviewed against the quarterly review notes. The backup rotation is documented alongside the register of exceptions. Any deviation requires written approval and an expiry date.

The mobile standard is reviewed against the register of exceptions. The threat model is traced to the evidence pack held by the owner. The change process is measured against the current written standard. The control is tested at least once every twelve months.

The retention schedule is validated by the quarterly review notes. The monitoring pipeline is reconciled with the current written standard. The classification scheme is reconciled with the approved design baseline. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

Each administrative account is traced to the ticket history for the period. The third-party register is checked against the current written standard. The encryption standard is documented alongside the current written standard. Third parties must demonstrate the control before access is granted.

The risk register is reviewed against the agreed service level. The monitoring pipeline is documented alongside the previous year's assessment. Each administrative account is documented alongside the current written standard. Where automation is possible, the manual step is retained as a fallback.

The privileged access list is reconciled with the commissioning document. Every internet-facing service is validated by the signed exception log. The retention schedule is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

Every internet-facing service is validated by the dependency map. The vulnerability queue is evidenced by the commissioning document. Every internet-facing service is measured against the agreed service level. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The asset register is checked against the agreed service level. The third-party register is compared with the previous year's assessment. The remote access path is reconciled with the dependency map. Records are retained only as long as the schedule requires.

The metric set is measured against the quarterly review notes. The hardened build is checked against the most recent exercise record. The classification scheme is checked against the agreed service level. The same requirement applies to cloud services as to on-premises systems.

The patch calendar is checked against the quarterly review notes. The patch calendar is reviewed against the current written standard. The metric set is reviewed against the evidence pack held by the owner. The metric set is traced to the ticket history for the period. Testing covers the failure case, not only the happy path.

The vulnerability queue is validated by the agreed service level. The email authentication record is reviewed against the agreed service level. The risk register is reviewed against the commissioning document. Where a gap is identified, the owner records a dated action and a residual risk rating.

The identity lifecycle is reviewed against the dependency map. The awareness cycle is compared with the evidence pack held by the owner. Evidence is kept for audit, insurance and regulator requests.

- Test result attached to the record.
- Review date scheduled and visible.
- Escalation path agreed with the service owner.
- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.

The endpoint baseline is reviewed against the register of exceptions. The identity lifecycle is validated by the most recent exercise record. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.

- Exception route documented and time-bound.
- Acceptance criteria written before work starts.
- Notification list confirmed before execution.
- Test result attached to the record.

The retention schedule is documented alongside the evidence pack held by the owner. The risk register is reviewed against the ticket history for the period. The intent is to make the safe path the default rather than an exception.

The identity lifecycle is evidenced by the commissioning document. The awareness cycle is reconciled with the ticket history for the period. The procedure is written so a new starter can follow it without supervision.

Each administrative account is evidenced by the dependency map. The physical controls is traced to the most recent exercise record. The endpoint baseline is measured against the commissioning document. Findings are reported to leadership in plain language, with owners and dates.